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Abstract
The increasing cost of political campaigns and its impact on the electoral process
are issues of paramount importance in modern democracies. We propose a theory
of electoral accountability in which candidates choose whether or not to commit to
constituency service and whether or not to pay a campaign cost to advertise their plat-
form. A higher campaign cost decreases voter welfare when partisan imbalance is low.
However, when partisan imbalance is high, a higher campaign cost is associated with a
higher expected level of constituency service. More costly campaigns can thus have a
rebalancing effect that improves electoral accountability. We discuss the implications of
our findings for campaign finance regulation and present empirical evidence consistent
with our key predictions.
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In February of 1912, while addressing the Ohio Constitutional Convention, Theodore
Roosevelt stated: “We hold it a prime duty of the people to free our government from the
control of money in politics.” Over a century later, the role of money in politics is no less
important, nor less debated. According to the Center for Responsive Politics, in the last
four decades the cost of electoral campaigns has grown significantly faster than inflation: In
the 2012 electoral cycle, candidates spent $1.5 billion in Congressional races and $1.8 billion
in the presidential race, over 60% more than eight years before.1
In the 21st century, Roosevelt’s view that money in politics hampers accountability is
still a widely held belief. According to recent polls, more than 75% of Americans support
limits to electoral spending.2 Several scholars (Abramowitz, 1991; Jacobson, 1980; Sorauf,
1992; Gross et al., 2002; Meirowitz, 2008), however, have warned against the unintended
consequences of existing regulatory solutions. Limiting the use of money in politics can
have anti-competitive effects (Smith, 1996; Sullivan, 1998): By preventing candidates from
publicizing their policy commitments, regulation can mute cash’s powerful megaphone (Co-
hen, 2012)—that is, money’s ability to disseminate valuable political information across the
electorate.
This paper studies how the cost of political advertising, which we refer henceforth as
‘campaign cost’ (ignoring other costly campaign activities such as get-out-the-vote), affects
electoral accountability. Using a stylized model of electoral competition, we show that the
effect of campaign cost depends critically on the level of partisan imbalance (defined as the ex-
1Even in countries where political advertisement is publicly funded, political spending can be significant:
For example, in the 2007 French presidential run-off alone, Nicolas Sarkozy and Se´gole`ne Royal spent a
combined total of roughly 40 millions euros (JORF, 2008). In his subsequent reelection campaign, Sarkozy’s
campaign exceeded the legal maximum. This resulted in a loss of about EUR11m in foregone subsidies for
his party (the UMP).
2Gallup Poll. June 15-16, 2013. Retrieved on 3/11/2014 at www.pollingreport.com/politics.htm.
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ante competiveness of the electoral race). When partisan imbalance is low—that is, ex-ante
electoral competitiveness is high, an increase in the campaign cost always reduces politicians’
effort towards their constituents. In contrast, when partisan imbalance is high—that is, ex-
ante electoral competitiveness is low, an increase in the campaign cost can benefit voters.
Greater campaign cost increases the incentives of the trailing candidate (i.e., the candidate
who is electorally disadvantaged ex-ante) to commit to a policy beneficial to voters. The
trailing candidate is then more likely to win—this is the rebalancing effect—and voters more
likely to obtain their preferred policy. We find empirical support for our core predictions
when testing the model using data from the U.S. House of Representatives.
Our theory of electoral accountability and campaign cost is predicated on two basic
notions: (i) electoral communication has an informative role—that is, political advertising
helps voters learn about candidates’ platforms—and (ii) in the absence of electoral incentives,
voters’ and candidates’ objectives are not fully aligned. Building on a long tradition in formal
theory, we study a parsimonious and tractable formal model satisfying those requirements.
The model features a representative voter, who is faced with the choice between two
candidates running for a political office. Each candidate can commit to a low-effort policy
or to a high-effort policy. The high-effort policy is a specific and verifiable activity that,
relative to the low-effort policy, is beneficial for voters but costly for the politician (be-
cause it requires, for example, mobilizing scarce resources like influence, time, and staff, or
seeking expertise across traditional party lines). The low-effort policy can be interpreted
as a commitment to the candidate’s party traditional platform, while the high-effort policy
corresponds to a commitment to high level of constituency service.3 Constituency service
3In our framework, constituency service should be understood as any nonpartisan activity which imposes
a cost on the politician performing it and is beneficial to voters. One example among others is appropriation
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enhances a candidate’s electoral prospects, but requires communication through a costly ad-
vertising campaign, which we model as a discrete choice.4 Unlike the cost of implementing
the high-effort policy, which is paid only if a candidate is elected, the campaign cost is paid
independently of the electoral outcome.
Our theoretical framework is best illustrated with an example. A congressional district
is eligible for federal funds for re-purposing an old industrial site and revamping its local
economy. Candidates can either be vague about the issue and run a campaign focused on
their party’s traditional platform (e.g., social justice or economic liberty), or tackle the issue
by making specific, verifiable promises about exploiting the opportunity (e.g., obtaining per-
mits or attracting public funds). The electoral success of the latter strategy crucially hinges
on the candidate’s ability to spend time on the campaign trail and money on advertising
to publicize his commitment. Its viability depends on the size of the costs associated with
fulfilling such campaign promise once in office. How does a politician’s incentive to make
these commitments depend on the campaign cost?
As voters get the benefit and none of the associated cost, they always would like candi-
dates to commit to constituency service. In contrast, since commitment to the high-effort
policy, in equilibrium, needs to be advertised, the presence of a positive campaign cost
incurred regardless of the electoral outcome reduces candidates’ incentives to commit to
voters’ preferred policy. As a consequence, voters are always better off when candidates
could freely advertise their commitment. Furthermore, other things equal, a higher cost of
advertising deepens the misalignment of interests between voters and politicians. Intuition
of federal funds. It should be noted that our definition of constituency service is more encompassing than
e.g. Cain et al. (1984).
4Given that we model advertising campaign as a binary choice, the campaign cost can be understood as
the total cost of informing voters. It can also be interpreted as the fixed cost of political advertising.
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thus suggests—against the idea of cash’s powerful megaphone—that there should always be
a negative relationship between the campaign cost and electoral accountability, as measured
by commitment to constituency service.
The main theoretical contribution of this paper is to show that the above intuition is
correct only when the level of partisan imbalance is low. In that case, a higher campaign cost
always reduces the likelihood that the high-effort policy is implemented. When, in contrast,
imbalance is high, a greater campaign cost reduces the leading candidate’s incentive to
commit to constituency service, as it becomes more costly to do so. As a result, the trailing
candidate, who has little chance of winning the election if he chooses the low-effort policy,
faces better electoral prospects when he promises a high level of constituency service. This
increases his willingness to commit to the high-effort policy. Greater campaign cost then has
a rebalancing effect: It improves the electoral chances of the trailing candidate.
Greater campaign cost can also improve electoral accountability. Voters benefit from the
high-effort policy whenever at least one candidate commits to it. Therefore, the leading can-
didate’s commitment to constituency service matters only when the trailing candidate does
not propose the high-effort policy. As the campaign cost increases, the trailing candidate is
more likely to promise high effort, thereby limiting the impact of the leading candidate’s re-
duced commitment to constituency service. For high campaign cost, the increased probability
of commitment by the trailing candidate dominates the reduced probability of commitment
by the leading candidate, and voters are on average more likely to obtain their preferred
policy.
The rebalancing effect of greater campaign cost has important implications for campaign
finance regulation. Recent polls have shown that a majority of voters favors a publicly
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funded campaign finance system.5 Our results, however, suggest that the electorate would
not always benefit from subsidizing candidates’ campaign cost. When partisan imbalance and
the campaign cost are low, candidates always propose high level of constituency service. Any
public subsidy then can only reduce voter welfare: Voters would bear part of the campaign
cost without changing candidates’ behavior. When the campaign cost is high, a subsidy
is very beneficial as it increases the likelihood one candidate commits to the high-effort
policy. For intermediate levels of partisan imbalance and campaign cost, the effect is more
subtle. Due to the rebalancing effect, when the campaign cost is relatively high, the trailing
candidate is already very likely to promise constituency service so the cost of subsidizing
campaigns tends to outweigh the benefit. When the campaign cost is relatively low, the
leading candidate is likely to propose the high-effort policy, but the cost of incentivizing
more effort is low so the benefit of a subsidy tends to outweigh its cost. Voters, however,
may be better off taxing campaign expenditures to increase the campaign cost and benefit
fully from the rebalancing effect at no cost.
Our theory generates novel and clear testable predictions regarding the relationship be-
tween politicians’ effort to secure benefits for their constituents, campaign cost, and partisan
imbalance. Following established practices in the empirical literature on political account-
ability (De Figueredo et al., 2003; Stro¨mberg, 2004; Albouy, 2009; Snyder and Stro¨mberg,
2010; Berry et al., 2010), we provide a first assessment of our theory using data from the
U.S. House of Representatives. In particular, we study the relationship between the per-unit
price of political advertising (our proxy for the cost of informing voters) and district-level
discretionary federal outlays (our proxy for constituency service) as a function of the dif-
5See, for example, Gallup Poll. June 15-16, 2013. Retrieved on 3/11/2014 at
www.pollingreport.com/politics.htm.
6
ference in presidential candidates’ vote shares (our proxy for partisan imbalance). While
federal outlays are an imperfect measure of a representative’s effort, the amount of resources
expended by legislators to communicate such accomplishments to their constituents points
to the importance of this type of activities (Druckman et al., 2009; Grimmer, 2013a and b;
Grimmer et al., 2012).
We find evidence in favor of our theory. When the level of partisan imbalance is low,
more expensive political advertising is associated with lower federal discretionary spending.
As partisan imbalance increases, however, the statistical association becomes weaker, and its
sign eventually switches. In the top quartile of partisanship, an increase in the price of polit-
ical advertising is associated with higher federal discretionary spending. This relationship is
robust to the inclusion of key determinants of federal spending (e.g., seniority and committee
assignment), as well as alternative specifications of the main variables of interest. We also
provide suggestive evidence consistent with the proposed mechanism. Controlling for the
level of imbalance, the marginal effect of greater campaign cost on constituency service is
larger and more likely to be positive for ‘trailing’ candidates (that is, candidates from the
relatively less popular party in the district) than for ‘leading’ candidates (that is, candidates
from the relatively more popular party). These differences, however, are not statistically
different at conventional level.
We conclude this introduction by connecting our work to the most closely related lit-
erature. A long tradition in formal theory studies how electoral incentives and partisan
imbalance influence politicians’ behavior (Downs, 1957; Wittman, 1983; Calvert, 1985; Pers-
son and Tabellini, 2000; Groseclose, 2001; Aragone`s and Palfrey, 2002; Ashworth and Bueno
de Mesquita, 2006; Aragone`s and Xefteris, 2012). We depart from this literature by assum-
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ing that political communication is costly. Although we are not the first to introduce this
assumption (Austen-Smith, 1987; Grossman and Helpman, 1996; Prat, 2002; Bailey 2004;
Coate, 2004; Ashworth, 2006; Meirowitz, 2008), there are important differences between the
existing literature and this paper.
First, the cost of electoral campaigns is usually assumed to be borne by Special Interest
Groups (SIGs) in exchange for political favors. Motivated by the idea that candidates, and
not donors, choose the allocation of their electoral funds (and face the associated opportunity
costs), and in light of the empirical evidence that direct campaign contributions per se do
not affect policy stances (Ansolabehere et al., 2003), we assume that communicating with
voters imposes a cost on candidates themselves.6 In addition to its empirical foundations,
this approach has substantive theoretical implications.7
Second, the existing literature on costly campaigns focuses on adverse selection and/or
ideological differentiation among candidates. In the present work we instead focus on con-
stituency service, building on empirical evidence that the benefits received by districts
(Druckman et al., 2009) and politicians’ activism (Egan, 2014) play an important role in
candidates’ communication strategies and electoral appeal. While we do not deny the im-
portance of ideology in determining political outcomes, this paper shows how focusing on
common value attributes leads to novel—and equally important—implications for campaign
finance regulation.
6Even when the campaign cost is financed by SIGs, fund-raising should still represent an important source
of opportunity cost for a candidate (Daley and Snowberg, 2009).
7The traditional model of election, featuring commitment and costless communication, can be thought as
a first-price auction, where policy commitments play the role of bids. In our model, due to the introduction
of campaign costs, electoral competition is more similar to an auction with participation costs (Samuelson,
1985; McAfee and McMillan, 1987).
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 describes our model of electoral
accountability. Section 2 studies the effect of changes in campaign costs on the model’s
key observables as well as on voter welfare. Section 3 discusses the model’s implication for
campaign finance regulation. Section 4 presents a first empirical assessment of our theory’s
key implications. Section 5 concludes.
1 A model of electoral accountability
We consider a one-period model with two candidates and one representative voter (for which
we reserve the pronoun “she”). Candidates (labeled L and R) compete for an elected office,
which they value. Each candidate j ∈ {R,L} can either commit to a low-effort policy
(pj = 0), or to a high-effort policy (pj = 1). Relative to a low-effort policy, the high-effort
policy benefits the voter and entails an implementation cost (k > 0) for the politician. This
simple dichotomy captures the misalignment of incentives between politicians and voters
when it comes to the provision of constituency service versus other activities (such as the
pursuit of partisan goals, or undertakings associated with private returns for politicians).
Electoral accountability in our setting is thus measured by commitment to the high-effort
policy.
The voter learns a candidate’s policy platform (pj) if and only if the candidate actively
advertises it (yj = 1, j ∈ {L,R}). While this assumption can be weakened (see Appendix
B.2), it allows us to focus on the informative role of political advertising in its starkest
form. Communicating his platform (yj = 1) is costly for a candidate (with symmetric cost
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c > 0), as it requires time and effort on the campaign trail as well as spending on political
advertising.
The voter’s payoff is normalized to 0 and 1 when the elected politician implements the
low-effort and high-effort policy, respectively. The voter’s utility also depends on partisan
shocks {R, L}, revealed to the voter before the election, but after candidates’ platform and
communication choices. The partisan shocks capture the voter’s evaluation of candidates’
party label.8 The shocks j are drawn from two (common knowledge) Cumulative Distri-
bution Functions with support [0, ], j ∈ {L,R}. Let Πj = Pr(j ≥ −j). Without loss of
generality, we assume that ΠR ∈ [1/2, 1).9 The difference between ΠR and ΠL captures the
level of partisan imbalance in favor of the right-wing candidate, to whom we then refer as
the leading candidate (L is thus the trailing candidate). To simplify the derivation of the
results, we also assume that the value of the partisan shocks cannot be too large:  < 1. The
voter’s utility, as a function of the elected candidate e ∈ {R,L}, is
uv(e) = pe + e. (1)
Candidates care about holding office.10 If candidate j is elected and implements the
low-effort policy, he enjoys a payoff normalized to one. Such payoff is reduced by an amount
k > 0 if the elected politician chooses the high-effort policy p = 1. We normalize the value
8To adhere to the empirical tests that follow, we refer to (L, R) as partisan shocks. More generally,
these shocks capture valence components that are exogenous with respect to the electoral race. Technically,
the preference shocks eliminate equilibria that rely on peculiar belief structures associated with voter’s
indifference.
9For simplicity, the distribution of partisan shocks constitute the only source of imbalance among can-
didates (ΠR ≥ ΠL). However, the model’s predictions would be very similar if we were also to assume
asymmetries in the cost of raising funds (cR < cL).
10All the results in this paper are robust to the introduction of policy motivation in candidates’ preferences
as long as this weight is not too large. Especially, our main result (the rebalancing effect) is stronger when
politicians are partially policy motivated (see Appendix B.1 for more details).
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of being out of office to zero. After choosing their platform, candidates choose whether to
advertise it (at the incremental cost c > 0) or not. Candidate j’s payoff is then given by:
uj(pj, yj) = I{e=j}(1− kpj)− cyj. (2)
The policy cost k captures three possible aspects of an elected official’s job: (i) time and
resources for constituency service (e.g., in the example developed in the introduction, time
to secure subsidies and attract private investors), (ii) the political capital required to build
consensus and overcome veto players (Hall and Deardorff, 2006), and (iii) the opportunity
cost of pursuing committee assignments linked to constituency interests (rather than their
more suitable or desirable ones—for a ranking of committees, see Groseclose and Stewart,
1998; Stewart and Groseclose, 1999; and Stewart, 2011).
The timing of the game is as follows:
1. Candidates choose a platform: low-effort (pj = 0) or high-effort (pj = 1) policy.
2. Candidates choose whether or not to advertise their platform: yj ∈ {0, 1}.
3. For each of the two candidates, the voter observes pj if and only if yj = 1.
4. The voter observes the realization of the partisan shocks (L, R).
5. The voter elects one of the two candidates, i.e., e ∈ {L,R}.
6. The elected candidate implements pe, payoffs are realized.
In this model, candidates commit to the policy platform they choose.11 We believe that,
in this context, the commitment assumption can be justified on empirical grounds: Campaign
11In particular, we assume that a candidate still implements his platform when he does not communicate
with the voter. Removing this assumption does not change any of the results. The critical assumption is
that the voter, when hearing (resp., not hearing) a candidate’s policy stance rationally expects the candidate
to act on his promise (resp., on what she though he initially committed to).
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promises have strong predictive power on future behavior in the legislature (Sulkin, 2009),
especially on relatively more “common value” issues such as attracting new job-creating in-
dustries (Ringquist and Dasse, 2004), even when these positions are implicitly embedded in
highly symbolic campaign images (Sulkin and Swigger, 2008). A direct (and technically con-
venient) implication of this assumption is that communication can only affect a candidate’s
chance of being elected. It does not change his payoff once elected.
Our equilibrium concept is Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium, with the additional restriction
of excluding weakly dominated strategies. When multiple equilibria arise, we select the one
associated with the highest payoff to the voter. In what follows, the term “equilibrium”
refers to this class of equilibria.
Before proceeding to the analysis, we remark that due to the costs associated with the
high-effort policy, a candidate commits to p = 1 only if he has sufficient electoral incentives to
do so. To make electoral accountability at least theoretically possible, we assume throughout
that the implementing cost (k) and the campaign cost (c) are not too high compared to the
benefit from office: c < 1− k.
2 Campaign costs and electoral accountability
We first study candidates’ advertising choice. Our model predicts a strong correlation be-
tween commitment to the high-effort policy and political advertising: A candidate pays the
campaign cost if and only if he commits to p = 1.12 Candidates thus face a double cost
12This strong correlation is a consequence of our assumption that political advertising is a discrete choice.
The main implication that candidates communicate more when they commit to a policy the voter values
would hold in a more general model where candidates’ advertising expenditures are a continuous variable
(for a model along these lines, see Prato and Wolton, 2015).
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of committing to the high-effort policy: the cost of implementing it (borne only if elected)
and the cost of advertising this commitment to the voter (borne regardless of the electoral
outcome).
Lemma 1. A candidate j ∈ {L,R} pays the communication cost (yj = 1) if and only if he
commits to the high-effort policy (pj = 1).
The intuition behind Lemma 1 is clear. A politician incurs the implementation cost k
only if he commits to the high-effort policy. Hence, the low-effort policy can be understood
as a candidate’s default option: He has no incentive to pay a cost to reveal that he proposes
the low-effort policy. But this implies that, when choosing the high-effort policy, a candidate
must advertise his platform.
A direct implication of Lemma 1 is that each candidate has effectively two feasible strate-
gies: high-effort policy with a costly advertising campaign or low-effort policy without ad-
vertising campaign. When candidates commit to the same strategy, the voter’s electoral
decision is driven by the partisan shocks (i.e., vote for R when R > L and vice versa—we
can ignore draws which are zero probability event). When candidates choose different poli-
cies, the voter always elects the candidate who proposes the high-effort policy due to our
assumptions that the shocks are not too large. Table 1 represents the strategic interaction
between the two candidates, and Proposition 1 describes the equilibrium of this electoral
game.
Table 1: The electoral game induced by the voter’s behavior.
L\R p = 0 p = 1
p = 0 ΠL,ΠR 0, 1− k − c
p = 1 1− k − c, 0 ΠL(1− k)− c,ΠR(1− k)− c
13
Proposition 1. Let k∗ := 1− ΠL
ΠR
. In equilibrium,
(i) If k ≥ k∗, both candidates commit to the high-effort policy (pj = 1, yj = 1) if c ≤ (1−k)ΠL,
and to the low-effort policy (pj = 0, yj = 0) otherwise.
(ii) If k < k∗, both candidates commit to the high-effort policy if c ≤ (1− k)ΠL and choose
the low-effort policy if c > ΠR − k. When, instead, c ∈ ((1 − k)ΠL,ΠR − k], candidate j
commits to the high-effort policy with probability αj, where
αL :=
k + c− ΠL
ΠR − ΠL(1− k) ; αR :=
1− k − c− ΠL
(1− k)ΠR − ΠL (3)
As pointed out above, a candidate commits to the high-effort policy if and only if the
electoral reward is greater than the combined implementation (k) and campaign (c) costs.
When these costs are very small, committing to the high-effort policy is a strictly dominant
strategy for both candidates. Conversely, when these costs are very large, committing to
the high-effort policy is a strictly dominated strategy for both candidates. The case of
intermediate costs is more subtle. First, it is important to notice that the leading candidate
R has an incentive to choose the same policy as L to take advantage of the favorable partisan
shock. L, on the other hand, would prefer distinguishing himself from R (either to gain
electorally or to avoid the costs of high effort with little electoral reward). This ‘hide-and-
seek’ game implies that the equilibrium can only be in mixed strategies.13
The mixed strategy equilibrium can only arise when candidate R has a strong incentive to
imitate L; that is, when partisan imbalance is sufficiently high. The range of the (c, k) space
associated with a mixed strategy equilibrium thus depends on the degree of partisan imbal-
13A similar phenomenon occurs in Bhattachaya’s (2014) adverse selection model where information about
candidates’ quality can only be revealed to voters when candidates use different messages.
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ance: As ΠR approaches 1/2, the support of the the mixed strategy equilibrium converges to
the empty set. Conversely, as ΠR approaches one, the area defined by c ∈ ((1−k)ΠL,ΠR−k]
approaches the whole parameter space.
Having characterized the equilibrium, we now discuss how candidates’ behaviors are
affected by the campaign cost c. When the equilibrium is in pure strategies, an increase
in the campaign cost can only decrease candidates’ probability of committing to the high-
effort policy. The reason is that the opportunity cost of committing to the high-effort policy
increases, while the associated electoral reward remains unchanged. Consequently, voter
welfare cannot be improved from c = 0. When the equilibrium is in mixed strategies, the
relationship between campaign cost and candidates’ incentives to commit to the high-effort
policy depends on their ex-ante electoral standing: The leading candidate R’s probability of
commitment to high effort decreases with c, while it increases for the trailing candidate L.
Corollary 1. (i) The voter welfare is maximized when c = 0
(ii) When the equilibrium is in mixed strategies, ∂αL/∂c > 0 and ∂αR/∂c < 0.
In a mixed strategy equilibrium (when imbalance is large enough), the two candidates’
decisions to commit to p = 1 are affected by fundamentally different forces. The leading
candidate R has an incentive to choose the high-effort policy only when the trailing candidate
L chooses high effort with sufficiently large probability. In that case, choosing low effort
is likely to result in a defeat, while matching the L’s platform allows him to exploit the
favorable partisan shock. Conversely, the trailing candidate, who gains from distinguishing
himself from the leading candidate, has a stronger incentive to choose high effort when
his opponent chooses low effort with sufficiently large probability. As the campaign cost
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increases, equilibrium requires that the incentive to choose the high-effort policy increases
for both candidates. For that to happen, it must be that the trailing candidate’ probability
of choosing p = 1 increases and that the leading candidate’s decreases. As a result, the
overall probability that the trailing candidate wins the election increases with the campaign
cost. This is the rebalancing effect.
What are the implications of the rebalancing effect for electoral accountability and voter
welfare? When partisan imbalance is low, a greater campaign cost can only lower the prob-
ability that candidates commit to high effort and, therefore, can only reduce voter welfare.
When partisan imbalance is large and the equilibrium is in mixed strategies, greater cam-
paign cost affects L and R’s strategies in opposite directions, so the effect of higher c at first
seems ambiguous. But it is important to notice that the voter benefits from the high-effort
policy whenever at least one candidate commits to p = 1. So R’s commitment to high effort
matters only if the trailing candidate L does not promise the high-effort policy. For cam-
paign cost close to (1− k)ΠL, candidate L does not commit to p = 1 with high probability
so any reduction in R’s probability to commit to the high-effort policy decreases electoral
accountability. For campaign cost close to ΠR − k, candidate L commits to p = 1 with
high probability so a reduction in R’s probability to commit to the high-effort policy has
little effect. As L’s probability to commit to p = 1 increases with c, greater campaign cost
improves electoral accountability for sufficiently large c (i.e., c ∈ [1−k
2
,ΠR − k)).14
14More formally, the probability that at least one candidate proposes the high-effort policy is Pr(pe =
1) = αR +αL −αRαL. As αL and αR are linear in c, Pr(pe = 1) is convex. Therefore, Pr(pe = 1) increases
if and only if greater c leads to a more asymmetric strategy profile (which happens if and only if c > 1−k2 ).
More asymmetry in the probability of choosing high effort improves the efficiency of the overall outcome:
the chances that neither candidate chooses high effort are lower.
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Better electoral accountability then translates into higher voter welfare whenever the
size of the partisan shocks is not too large.15 This last condition ensures that the gain
from obtaining the high-effort policy with greater probability dominates the loss in term of
partisan shock from electing the trailing candidate L with higher probability.
Proposition 2.
(i) An increase in the campaign cost strictly increases the probability that the high-effort
policy is implemented if and only if c ∈ ((1 − k)/2,ΠR − k) and k < 1 − 2ΠL, and weakly
decreases it otherwise.
(ii) There exists ̂ > 0 such that for all  < ̂, there exists c() ∈ ((1 − k)/2,ΠR − k) such
an increase in the campaign cost increases the voter welfare if and only if c ∈ (c(),ΠR − k)
and k < 1− 2ΠL.
To summarize, our results show that an increase in the campaign cost (i) can only hurt
the voter when partisan imbalance is low, but (ii) can also improve accountability when
partisan imbalance is high, due to the rebalancing effect of higher c. To our knowledge,
this result provides novel and qualified formalization of the notion of cash as a “powerful
megaphone.” It is important to stress that these results do not rely on equilibrium selection:
In the relevant range (c ∈ ((1 − k)ΠL,ΠR − k]), the mixed strategy equilibrium that we
consider is the unique equilibrium.
15This is only a sufficient condition, a stronger condition is available upon request.
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3 Implications for campaign finance regulation
After having studied how exogenous changes in the campaign cost affect platforms and
accountability, it seems natural to study the model’s implication for campaign finance regu-
lation. Specifically, we characterize the optimal subsidy when, for a given c (determined by
market forces in the media markets included in candidates’ district), the voter pays directly
a portion s ∈ [0, c] of a candidate’s advertising cost, while leaving c − s to the candidate’s
own fund-raising efforts.
To study the most favorable setting for campaign finance regulation, we assume that the
subsidy enters linearly in the voter’s utility (i.e., there is no dead-weigh loss of taxation).
Under this assumption, her objective function becomes pe + e− s(yL + yR). To simplify the
analysis and focus on the effect of campaign cost, we also assume (without significant loss
of generality) that (i) k is arbitrarily close to zero and (ii) the partisan shocks are perfectly
negatively correlated and have binary support (R, L) ∈ {(, 0), (0, )}.16 The voter’s ex ante
expected utility as a function of the subsidy s can be written as
W (s) = + αR(1− ΠL) + αL(1− ΠR)− αRαL(1− )− s(αL + αR) (4)
When c is already low enough so that both candidates already commit to high effort with
probability one (in this simplified environment, when c < ΠL), any positive subsidy would
simply transfer utility from the voter to the candidates without affecting their behavior.
16Adding a positive implementation cost would change the thresholds determined below, but would not
affect the reasoning as long as  is sufficiently low and k < 1− 2ΠL so the rebalancing effect can be welfare-
improving. The second point allows us to ignore problems associated with conditional expectations which
significantly complicate the analysis without adding substantive insights on the issue of campaign finance
regulation.
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When, instead, the cost is large enough, the voter might gain from a positive subsidy.
However, as Proposition 3 shows, the optimal subsidy (for the voter) is not always positive.
Proposition 3. Let c˜ = ΠR − (ΠR − ΠL)2. The voter’s optimal campaign subsidy is:
s∗(c) =

0 c ≤ ΠL
c− ΠL c ∈ (ΠL, c˜]
0 c ∈ (c˜,ΠR]
c− ΠR c ∈ (ΠR, 1]
The voter obtains the high-effort policy whenever at least one candidate proposes it.
Since the voter must subsidize any candidate who engages in costly political advertising,
when c > ΠL, the best scenario for the voter is that one candidate commits to high effort
with probability one, whereas the other does so with probability zero.
This optimal scenario arises in two cases. First, when the campaign cost faced by can-
didates is ΠR (i.e., c − s = ΠR), so that the rebalancing effect is strongest and the trailing
candidate chooses high effort with probability one. Second, when the campaign cost faced by
candidates is ΠL, so that the rebalancing effect is weakest and the leading candidate chooses
high effort with probability one. Whenever the initial campaign cost satisfies c > ΠR, both
c − ΠL and c − ΠR result in the same expected policy payoff, and the voter has a strict
preference for the lowest of the two subsidies, c− ΠR.17
When the initial cost is below ΠR, the rebalancing effect cannot be fully exploited. How-
ever, the trailing candidate L chooses the high-effort policy with high probability whenever c
17This entails a loss in term of partisan shock (ΠL instead of ΠR), but this loss is always lower than the
gain in term of lower subsidy.
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is close enough to ΠR, while the subsidy c−ΠL required to induce the advantaged candidate
to choose high effort with probability one is very large. As a result, a campaign subsidy can
only reduce voter welfare and the voter prefers 0 subsidy. When c is close to ΠL, the gain
from inducing greater effort by the leading candidate outweighs the cost, and the optimal
subsidy is again positive.
Interestingly, our theory suggests that the voter would always prefer a tax on campaign
spending rather than a subsidy for relatively large c. By raising the campaign cost by an
amount ΠR − c, the voter can take full advantage of the rebalancing effect (the probability
of getting the high-effort policy increases) without using public resources. This negative
subsidy is effectively a form of Pigouvian taxation: The voter would be better off even is she
did not enjoy any direct benefit from the associated tax revenues.
Corollary 2. There exists ct ∈ (ΠL,ΠR) such that for all c ∈ (ct,ΠR), a tax t = ΠR − c on
campaign spending is optimal for the voter even if she does not enjoy the proceeds from it.
In our model, reducing the campaign cost improves the voter welfare because it increases
the probability the voter’s preferred policy is implemented. As such, our theoretical frame-
work develops an argument in favor of campaign finance even in the absence of special
interest groups exchanging contributions for political favors (as in Prat, 2002; Coate 2004;
Ashworth 2005). To the best of our knowledge, the logic behind our results is novel. Our
theoretical framework, however, also points out to the difficulty to design an optimal cam-
paign finance reform: the welfare-maximizing subsidy (for the voter) depends critically on
the current campaign cost and, under some condition, takes the form of a tax.
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4 Testable implications and empirical evidence
We now return to the positive implications of our model of electoral competition. Our theory
predicts that the probability that the elected representative implements the high-effort policy
should be:
• negatively correlated with the campaign cost for low levels of partisan imbalance;
• positively correlated with the campaign cost for high levels of partisan imbalance;
• negatively correlated with the degree of partisan imbalance, holding constant the cam-
paign cost.
In this section, we combine existing data sources from the U.S. House of Representatives
to present a prima facie cross sectional empirical assessment of our theory. To perform this
exercise, we need to find adequate empirical analogues for our three key variables: candidates’
effort, campaign cost, and partisan imbalance.
Drawing on a large body of research on the determinants of distributive politics in the
U.S. (De Figueredo et al., 2003; Stromberg, 2004; Albouy, 2009; Snyder and Stromberg,
2010; Berry et al., 2010), our proxy for a congressman’s effort is the amount of discretionary
federal spending received by his home district (precisely, high variation non-defense federal
outlays for the fiscal years 2006 and 2007).18 It is indisputable that securing federal outlays
captures only one dimension of electoral accountability. Furthermore, other political actors
can influence the allocations of those funds (Berry et al., 2010). Nonetheless, we believe that
this approach has important advantages over alternative measures.
18See Berry et al. (2010: 788) for a precise definition and description of this variable.
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Theoretically, securing federal funds captures important aspects of our notion of high-
effort policy. First, it is a relatively non-partisan activity for which the attribution of credit
is simpler than other accomplishments (e.g., drafting legislation, or assembling a coalition
supporting it), as witnessed by the fact that legislators from both parties heavily advertise
these achievements (Druckman et al., 2009; Grimmer et al., 2012; Grimmer 2013a and b).
Second, there is robust evidence that voters tend to electorally reward these activities (Levitt
and Snyder, 1997). Third, securing federal funds is a source of opportunity cost for politicians
and is correlated with other forms of constituency service. Snyder and Stro¨mberg (2010)
document how representatives who are relatively more sheltered from electoral pressures due
to exogenously low levels of media coverage are less likely to serve in committees representing
their constituents’ interests, less likely to vote against their party, and less successful at
securing federal funds (while they spend more time pursuing their broad political goals).
Empirically, federal outlays are easily measurable and display a large cross-sectional
variance (a great virtue, given the limited availability of data on advertising cost). Moreover,
since looking at federal outlays is a very common approach in the literature, our investigation
can be guided by established practices and informed by clear benchmarks.
In line with existing literature, we measure partisan imbalance by the absolute distance
in the vote share of the two presidential candidates in 2004.19
For the campaign cost, we use data from the Wisconsin Advertising Project (Goldstein
and Rivlin, 2007), which includes information on the number, length, and price of a large
number of political TV ads aired during the 2004 congressional, gubernatorial and presiden-
tial campaigns. Specifically, we approximate the campaign cost with the per-unit price of
19Source: the Swing State Project. Data available at http://www.swingstateproject.com/diary/4161/.
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political advertising (30-second spot). It is important to point out that this variable captures
only part of the cost of informing voters, which is determined by prices (taken as given) as
well as quantities of ads necessary for a candidate’s message to reach the electorate (which
depends on district characteristics). This is clearly a limitation of our empirical exercise.20
However, we do not believe this limitation is too severe as (i) using per-unit average prices al-
lows us to focus on an exogenous variable (not candidates’ strategic decisions), and (ii) total
advertising expenditures are positively correlated with the per-unit cost of ads (see Section
4.2 where we also perform our analysis with total expenditures as a robustness check). Using
per-unit price of ads also has some advantages. Indeed, we observe a candidate’s advertising
expenditures only when he chooses to advertise. But our core comparative statics rely on all
candidates, whether or not they advertise. With the per-unit price of ad, we approximate
the campaign cost faced by candidates who chose not to advertise.
Due to data availability, our analysis is limited to the 109th Congress.21 Drawing on our
theory (and in line with the existing literature), we estimate the following model:
yis = β0 + β1cis + β3piis + δpiis × cis +X ′isβ4 + γs + ui.
In our baseline specification, yis is the log of total federal outlays from “high variation
programs” awarded to congressional district i in State s. This variable, described in detail
in Berry et al. (2010), captures the amount of discretionary spending received by each
district. cis measures the average price of a 30-seconds political ad for the 2004 electoral
20In addition, the quantity of ads could also be affected by candidates’ strategic considerations. This would
introduce omitted variable biases which would likely affect our estimates. Unfortunately, data availability
makes it very hard to tackle this important issue.
21Our main constraints are the availability of data on political ads and the redistricting after the 2000
Census. See Table 3 and Appendix C for detailed information on the source of each variable.
23
campaign in district i. It is constructed from a population-weighted average of the mean
cost in each media market contained in district i. piis is partisan imbalance in district i.
Xis is a vector of congressman-specific and district-specific controls: information on party,
seniority status, membership and chairmanship of various committees, membership of party
leadership from Berry et al. (2010), and on median income, population, shares of urban and
minority population from the 2005 American Community Survey. γs is a state fixed effects.
Table 2 displays summary statistics for the main variables employed in our analysis. We
restrict our baseline specification to the 295 congressional districts for which the available
measure of ad cost covers at least 90% of the district population.
Table 4 reports the estimated coefficients from our baseline specification. Columns 1 to 4
show that partisan imbalance is not statistically associated with the level of federal outlays
without the inclusion of the interaction term. Once the data are organized according to our
theory, the coefficient of partisan imbalance and advertising cost are indeed negative and
statistically significant, and the interaction term is positive and statistically significant (all
three results are robust to the inclusion of district and congressman specific covariates, as
well as state fixed effects, as shown in columns 5 and 6).
Figure 1 displays the marginal effect of ad cost on federal outlays (and its 95% confidence
interval) implied by column (4) of Table 4. Consistent with our theory, the marginal effect
is negative for low levels of partisanship and positive for high levels of partisanship, as
illustrated by Figure 2, which displays the linear prediction of federal outlays as a function
of ad cost for various percentiles of partisan imbalance.
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Figure 1: Marginal effect of ad cost.
Figure 2: Predicted value of federal outlays, by percentile of partisan imbalance.
4.1 Evidence on the mechanism
Our theory also has implications regarding the source of the joint effect of imbalance and
campaign cost on accountability. In particular, under the assumptions of Proposition 2, an
increase in the campaign cost should result in (i) higher constituency service (conditional on
25
being elected) from the trailing candidate and (ii) lower constituency service (conditional on
being elected) from the leading candidate.22
To look for evidence of these differential effects, we create a dummy variable, Trailing,
which equals one in districts where the representative comes from a different party than the
presidential candidate who received the most votes in either of the two previous presidential
elections.23 Our theory predicts that:
• the marginal effect of ad cost on constituency service should always be negative in the
sub-sample of leading candidates (that is, for all levels of imbalance);
• compared to the baseline estimates, the threshold level of imbalance above which the
effect of ad cost is positive should be lower in the sub-sample of trailing candidates.
Figures 3a and 3b (as well as Table 5) show that the estimated marginal effects are
larger for trailing than for leading candidates.24 Specifically, in the sub-sample of trailing
candidates, the (point estimate of the) marginal effect is positive for values of imbalance
slightly above the median level in the overall population. In contrast, in the sub-sample of
leading candidates, the (point estimate of the) marginal effect is positive only above the 88th
percentile of imbalance.
22While it is immediate to verify these claims for the unconditional probability of committing to con-
stituency service, in the data we only observe constituency service conditional on an electoral victory. How-
ever, the probabilities of commitment to high effort conditional on winning exhibit similar relationships with
respect to c as αL and αR. Details available upon request.
23The results are quantitatively the same if we use only the 2004 presidential election. The number of
observations for trailing candidates shrink to 43 however, which is why we use both 2000 and 2004 presidential
elections.
24Due to the small number of observations, there is not enough power to condition on state fixed effects
or the full set of 25 congressman-specific covariates in Table 5. Instead, we run one regression controlling
for party and leadership positions and another regression controlling for committee membership. Due to
sample size issue, we also use a more generous cut-off for the measurement of ad cost (75% of the population
covered).
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It is important to stress that in a triple-interaction model, the estimated coefficient of Ad
Cost× Imbalance× Trailing is positive, but not statistically different from zero (see Table
D.1 in the Supplemental Appendix). Moreover, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the
marginal effects of Ad Cost depicted in Figures 3a and 3b are equal across sub-samples.25
While the lack of statistical significance can be due to the small sample size of the trailing
subsample (only 51 observations), we can only claim that the evidence presented in this
subsection is on balance consistent with our theory, and only suggestive.
(a) Trailing candidates (b) Leading candidates
Figure 3: Marginal effect of cost for trailing and leading candidates
4.2 An alternative measure of campaign cost
In this subsection, we consider total advertising expenditures as our measure of campaign
cost, taking advantage of the fact that the Wisconsin Advertising Project contains data on
the number of ads bought by candidates (provided by the Campaign Media Analysis Group,
henceforth CMAG). The dataset, however, contains only 129 districts with a positive number
of recorded ads. This is an issue if the lack of observation is due to non-random missing
25Due to the imbalance in covariates among sub-samples, the evidence would have to be interpreted with
caution even if the marginal effects were statistically different.
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data. This concern is mitigated by Hagen and Kolodny (2008), who argue that the CMAG
data are reliable when it comes to the presence of advertising by candidates (however, they
also argue that it is quite unreliable when it comes to total TV expenditures).
Consequently, we can use the presence of advertising to test another core prediction of
our theory: Candidates who advertise more should also secure more federal outlays for their
district (Lemma 1). We thus construct a dummy variable called ads dummy which equals
one when we observe a positive level of political advertising, and zero otherwise. Table
D.2 in the Appendix shows that ads dummy has a statistically significant and economically
meaningful association with federal outlays: In races with positive spending, federal outlays
are between 55 and 95 percentage points higher than in districts without positive observed
levels of spending.26
We can also use data on the number of ads to test whether the per-unit price of ads
is positively correlated with total advertising expenditures. We find that it is indeed the
case: The quantity of ads decreases with price, but the associated elasticity is below unity
when controlling for the quantity of ads by the opposing candidate (evidence available upon
request). Finally, we use price and quantity to approximate candidates’ total advertising
spending by each winning candidate (recall that this estimate is quite imprecise) and replicate
the baseline analysis of Table 4 (on the restricted sample with positive advertising). Despite
some loss of statistical significance (the loss in power is also substantial: the sample size no
longer allows us to use state fixed effects), total expenditure, imbalance, and their interaction
26To compute the effect of advertising, we use the formula provided in Kennedy (1981), the effect in
percent is 100[exp(bˆ−1/2(bˆ/t)2)−1], where bˆ is the estimated coefficient from Table D.2 and t its associated
t-statistic.
28
display a correlation pattern with federal outlays that is similar to the one documented in
our baseline specification (Table D.3 in the Appendix).
4.3 Discussion and robustness checks
Measurement of the advertising cost The measurement of the cost of 30-second spots,
has limitations that are widely acknowledged, despite the debate around their severity (Prior,
2001; Monson and Curtis, 2003; Franz et al., 2007; Hagen and Kolodny, 2008). In particular,
Hagen and Kolodny (2008) find that within Pennsylvania, the cost figures reported in the
CMAG data are likely to be overestimated and, more generally, suffer from measurement
error. This problem is particularly severe when estimating total expenditures for each can-
didate. Our specification, however, is based on the average ad cost and, as a consequence,
should be less sensitive to this issue. We also try to address this problem using an alterna-
tive measure of ad costs based on a larger sample that includes local and presidential races
(see Appendix C and Table D.4). We acknowledge, however, that the measurement issue
is a limitation of any empirical analysis of the effect of campaign costs using CMAG data.
Unfortunately, there is no alternative data source for advertising cost for the time period we
consider.
Endogeneity concerns One might suspect that the price of ads paid by candidates is
correlated with the closeness of a race, and the statistical association that we find purely
reflects demand shifts that resulted in higher price. We do not believe that this is a seri-
ous concern, for four reasons. First, and most important, our variable is constructed as a
population-weighted average of the average ad price in each media market included in the
district. Due to the imperfect geographic overlap between media markets and congressional
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districts, there must be an implausibly large geographic clustering of competitive races for
the above described problem to be a serious concern. Second, in our regressions we always
condition on partisan imbalance. Third, by FCC regulation, the price of political advertising
is the lowest unit rate, which depends on overall demand for advertising in the media market.
Fourth, in Appendix D, we explicitly test whether the closeness of a race affects ad prices.
We find that the predictive power of partisan imbalance on ad costs is not statistically sig-
nificant at any conventional level (see Table D.6). If, in light of this evidence, one concludes
that ad cost, but not partisan imbalance, is an exogenous variable for the purpose of our
study, then the interaction term between ad cost and partisan imbalance can also be shown
to be exogenous under certain conditions.27
Sample selection Our analysis could be affected by sample selection, since our baseline
specification covers only 68% of the congressional districts. In Appendix D, we adopt a more
generous cut-off for missing data on political ads (75% of the population), which allows us
to cover almost 82% of the districts. The estimates are robust and almost unchanged (Table
D.7).
Additional robustness tests In Appendix D, we report the result of several additional
robustness tests. Our estimates are fully robust to the use outlays from each of the two fiscal
years separately, as well as the use of a larger set of district specific covariates from the 2000
Census.28 Moreover, when we employ an alternative definition of partisan imbalance based
on the 2000 Presidential Vote Share or include Designated Market Areas fixed effects (an ex-
treme test, given that there are over 200 media markets), the point estimates lose statistical
27The necessary assumption is that E(piiui|ci) = E(piiui); that is, the degree of endogeneity of partisan
imbance does not depend on the ad cost. In this case, the assumptions necessary for the interaction term
to be consistently estimated are significantly relaxed (see Proposition 1 in Bun and Harrison, 2014)
28Here, we use 13 variables instead of 4, with the disadvantage of additional noise due to redistricting.
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significance at conventional levels, but are relatively unchanged in size. Our estimates are
similarly robust to the exclusion of outliers with respect to partisan imbalance (Table D.12).
To conclude, our analysis uncovers robust and previously undocumented empirical pat-
terns and shows that our theory provides a novel way to organize existing data sources. It
is important to stress, however, that our estimates should be seen as a first pass which,
we hope, will spark a more systematic and extensive empirical assessment. A clear answer
as to whether these newly discovered patterns can be interpreted causally is left for future
research.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we study a model of electoral accountability where acting in voters’ inter-
ests once in office and advertising policy commitments during the campaign are both costly
for politicians. We study how campaign cost affects politicians’ incentives to provide con-
stituency service.
Our theory shows that higher campaign cost reduces electoral accountability and voter
welfare when partisan imbalance is low. In contrast, we find that voters can benefit from a
higher campaign cost when the level of partisan imbalance is high. Greater campaign cost
has a rebalancing effect, which can result in higher expected level of constituency service, to
the benefit of the electorate. We provide a prima facie empirical assessment of our theory.
Evidence from the U.S. Congress are consistent with our predictions and show that the
mechanism we uncover is deserving of further empirical investigation.
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This paper rationalizes the idea of “cash’s powerful megaphone,” whose pro-competitive
effect on electoral races can be muted by campaign regulation. Indeed, we uncover circum-
stances under which voter welfare can only decrease as a result of a partial or full public
financing of campaigns. More generally, our theory highlights that federal regulation of
electoral campaigns can have highly heterogeneous effect on candidates’ choices and, ulti-
mately, electoral accountability. In particular, and given its importance in the U.S. context,
widespread gerrymandering might systematically change the welfare consequences of cam-
paign regulation.
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Table 2: Summary statistics
mean stand. dev. unique obs.
Federal outlays (Millions of USD) 824 1470 435
Ad Cost (USD/30 Seconds) 1026 633 346
Imbalance (Abs %) 23.16 16.83 435
Median income (ACS) (USD) 49255 13069 435
Population (ACS) 661754 53792 435
% Pop. Minority (ACS) .254 .182 435
% Urban Pop. .799 .187 435
.
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Table 3: Description of variables
Variable Source Description
Outlays Berry et al. (2010) Log of combined discretionary federal spending (see
Berry et al, 2010, for details and classifications of
different items) over the 2006 and 2007 fiscal years
Ad cost WiscAds Log of the average TV ad cost during the 2004 con-
gressional campaign. When congressional district
d spans multiple media markets, we use informa-
tion on zipcodes to construct a weighted average as
follows:
∑
z∈d popzcostm(z)/popd, where m(z) is the
media market to which zipcode z belongs to and
popz is the total population in zipcode z.
Imbalance Swing state project Log of (1 + margin), where margin is the absolute
value of the difference between the Democratic and
Republican presidential candidates in the 2004 elec-
tion.
Median income 2005 ACS Log of district median household income.
Population 2005 ACS Log of district population.
Minority 2005 ACS Percentage of population belonging to a minority.
Urban population 2010 Census Percentage of the population living in an urban area.
Party Berry et al. (2010) Dummy equal to one if the district’s representative
belongs to (or caucuses with) the Republican Party.
Leader Berry et al. (2010) Dummy equal to one if the district’s representative
is a party leader.
Freshman Berry et al. (2010) Dummy equal to one if the district’s representative
is in his/her first term.
Chair Berry et al. (2010) Dummy equal to one if the district’s representative
is chair in a committee.
Ranking member Berry et al. (2010) Dummy equal to one if the district’s representative
is a ranking member of a committee.
Committee member-
ship
Berry et al. (2010) Set of dummies, each equal to one if congressman
belongs to Committee X, which is one of the House’s
Standing Committees: Appropriations, Agriculture,
Armed Services, Banking, Budget, Education and
Workforce, Energy and Commerce, Government
Reform, Homeland Security, House Administra-
tion, International Relations, Judiciary, Resources,
Rules, Science, Small Business, Standards of Official
Conduct, Transportation, Veterans’ Affairs, Ways
and Means.
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Table 4: Federal outlays, campaign costs, and partisan imbalance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ad Cost -0.456∗∗ -0.456∗∗ -2.474∗∗∗ -2.433∗∗∗ -2.714∗∗∗
(-2.53) (-2.52) (-5.61) (-3.99) (-3.46)
Imbalance -0.001 0.007 -4.725∗∗∗ -4.346∗∗∗ -4.725∗∗∗
(-0.01) (0.05) (-4.09) (-3.23) (-2.78)
Imbalance × Ad Cost 0.687∗∗∗ 0.624∗∗∗ 0.673∗∗∗
(4.30) (3.32) (2.78)
Congressman and X X
District Covariates
State FE X
Observations 295 295 295 295 295 295
t statistics in parentheses (standard errors clustered at state level)
*significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%
Congressman and District covariates include median income, population, minor-
ity, urban population, party dummy, leadership dummy, freshman dummy, chair
dummies, ranking dummies, and committee membership dummies
Table 5: Separating trailing and leading candidates
Sample Leading Trailing
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ad Cost -2.190∗∗∗ -2.008∗∗ -2.470∗∗∗ -2.536∗∗∗ -2.323∗∗ -1.788∗∗∗
(-3.28) (-2.47) (-2.76) (-4.03) (-2.75) (-2.78)
Imbalance -3.931∗∗∗ -3.116∗ -4.239∗∗ -5.552∗∗ -6.259∗∗ -4.387∗
(-2.75) (-2.02) (-2.49) (-2.18) (-2.20) (-1.75)
Imbalance × Ad Cost 0.579∗∗∗ 0.445∗ 0.614∗∗ 0.829∗∗ 0.900∗∗ 0.636
(2.88) (2.00) (2.45) (2.21) (2.16) (1.62)
District Covariates X X X X
Ranking Dummies X X
Committee Dummies X X
Observations 295 295 295 51 51 51
t statistics in parentheses (standard errors clustered at state level).
*significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%
District covariates include median income, population, minority, urban popula-
tion
Ranking dummies include party dummy, leadership dummy, freshman dummy,
chair dummies, ranking dummies
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